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ABSTRACT 
Skyrocketing mobile data demands caused by increasing adoption of 
smartphones, tablet computers, and broadband-equipped laptops will soon 
swamp the capacity of our nation’s wireless networks, a fact that promises 
to stagnate a $1 trillion slice of the nation’s economy. Among scholars 
and policymakers studying this looming “spectrum crisis,” consensus is 
developing that regulators must swiftly reclaim spectrum licensed to other 
industries and reallocate those rights to wireless providers. In this 
interdisciplinary piece, we explain in succinct terms why this consensus is 
wrong. With data demands increasing at an exponential rate, spectrum 
reallocation plans that promise only linear growth are destined to fail. 
What regulators should focus on, instead, are policies that encourage the 
sluggish incumbents presently dominating the wireless industry to roll out 
new networking technologies (like tiered network architectures, cognitive 
radio, and multicell MIMO) that together may allow exponential increases 
in spectral efficiency. 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans have a seemingly insatiable appetite for wireless bandwidth. 
Global mobile data traffic has grown at an annual rate exceeding 140 
percent each year since 2008, and it is predicted to increase another 26-
fold by 2015.
1
 Spurred by increasing adoption of smartphones and tablet 
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computers, growth in the U.S. has outpaced worldwide averages, with 
domestic wireless providers like AT&T reporting a 30-fold increase in 
traffic between 3Q 2009 and 3Q 2010 alone.
2
 For the foreseeable future, it 
seems, mobile data demands will continue their exponential growth as 
users increasingly access multimedia, especially long-form HD video, and 
other data-intensive applications via mobile devices.
3
 
Unfortunately, the capacity of the nation’s wireless networks is not 
infinite. According to wireless providers, within spectrum bands allocated 
for commercial broadband use, increased competition for scarce 
bandwidth among mobile users will eventually lead to service bottlenecks 
that degrade network performance or worse.
4
 With more and more 
 
 
2010–2015, at 5 tbl. 3 (2011), available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ 
ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-520862.pdf [hereinafter CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING 
INDEX]; see also CODA RESEARCH CONSULTANCY, US MOBILE BROADBAND: BEHAVIOR, CONTENT 
AND FORECASTS, 2009–2015 (2009) [hereinafter CODA RESEARCH] (predicting roughly 35-fold 
growth between 2009 and 2014); YANKEE GROUP, SPECTRUM-RICH PLAYERS ARE IN THE DRIVER’S 
SEAT FOR MOBILE BROADBAND ECONOMICS (2009) (predicting roughly 24-fold growth between 2009 
and 2014); FCC, OMNIBUS BROADBAND INITIATIVE (OBI), MOBILE BROADBAND: THE BENEFITS OF 
ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM, OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 6, at 5 (2010), available at http://transition.fcc. 
gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1021/DOC-302324A1.pdf [hereinafter OBI TECHNICAL 
PAPER NO. 6] (concluding that “mobile data demand is expected to grow between 25 and 50 times 
current levels within 5 years”); Randall Stephenson, Chairman, CEO, & Pres., AT&T, Presentation to 
Investors, slide 8 (Mar. 2011), http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/pdf/INV_PRES_3-2111_FI 
NAL.pdf (predicting more modest, but still significant, growth of 8 to 10-fold between 2011 and 
2015).  
 2. See CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX, supra note 1, at 3 tbl. 1; Kris Rinne, Sr. Vice Pres. 
of Architecture & Planning, AT&T, Remarks at the FCC Spectrum Workshop 11–12 (Sept. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.broadband.gov/docs/ws_25_spectrum.pdf (“AT&T, over the last 3 years, has 
seen a 5,000 percent increase in our wireless data usage . . . .”); see also NAT’L SCI. FOUND., FINAL 
REPORT ON THE WORKSHOP ON ENHANCING ACCESS TO THE RADIO SPECTRUM 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/mps/ast/nsf_ears_workshop_2010_final_report.pdf [hereinafter ENHANCING ACCESS 
TO THE RADIO SPECTRUM] (“Since the release of the latest generation of smart phones, . . . data traffic 
on some mobile networks has increased by over 6000%.”); Press Release, International Data Corp., 
Worldwide Smartphone Market Expected to Grow 55% in 2011 and Approach Shipments of One 
Billion in 2015, According to IDC (June 9, 2011), available at http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp 
?containerId=prUS22871611 (documenting exponential growth in smartphone sales). 
 3. In 2010, video accounted for almost half of all mobile data traffic, a percentage that is 
projected to grow in the future. CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX, supra note 1, at 1; CODA 
RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 4 (“Video traffic . . . will form nearly two thirds (63%) of mobile 
broadband traffic by 2015.”). Moreover, the popularity of social networking has contributed to an 
explosion in the number of users accessing broadband video games. David Kushner, Facebook vs. 
Google: Game On, IEEE SPECTRUM, June 2011, http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-electronics/ 
gaming/facebook-vs-google-game-on/0 (noting that the worldwide gamer population skyrocketed from 
200 million in 2001 to 1 billion in 2011). 
 4. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., AT&T’s Big Bet on Spectrum Folly: The Merger Between 
AT&T and T-Mobile is a Vote of Impatience with Washington’s Proposed Fix for the Mobile Spectrum 
Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870385840457621 
4583761791412.html (noting that “AT&T[’s] . . . network in New York is sagging from all its iPhone 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/6
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wireless users clamoring for more and more bandwidth each year, wireless 
providers warn that the wireless industry will soon lack the spectrum 
resources sufficient to satisfy users’ demands, a looming “spectrum 
crunch”5 that many promise will stagnate an industry that grossed almost 
$160 billion in 2010.
6
 
To date, scholars studying the root causes of spectrum overcrowding 
have focused exclusively on the efficiency of FCC regulations dividing 
ownership of the airwaves.
7
 Scholarly consensus suggests that the 
upcoming crunch is predominantly, if not purely, the result of the FCC’s 
failure to place spectrum in the hands of society’s highest value users. 
Accordingly, calls for the government to transfer spectrum licenses from 
presumed low value users—namely, over-the-air television broadcasters 
and the government itself—to wireless providers have completely 
dominated policy debates. For years, virtually every scholarly article 
analyzing spectrum policy has called for the FCC to strip TV broadcasters 
of some or all of their spectrum allocation
8
 and for the government to open 
 
 
users” and quoting FCC Chief Julius Genachowski: “The spectrum crunch is real. If we don’t do 
something about it we’ll face lousy service and sky-high consumer prices.”).  
 5. See, e.g., Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Mobile Broadband: A 21st Century Plan for 
U.S. Competitiveness, Innovation and Job Creation, Remarks at the New Am. Found. (Feb. 24, 2010), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296490A1.pdf (using the terms 
“spectrum crunch” and “spectrum crisis”); Mitchell Lazarus, The Great Radio Spectrum Famine, IEEE 
SPECTRUM, Oct. 2010, http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/wireless/the-great-radio-spectrum-famine 
(using the term “spectrum famine”). 
 6. See Wireless Quick Facts: Mid-Year Figures, CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, http:// 
www.ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Jan. 28, 2012); ENHANCING 
ACCESS TO THE RADIO SPECTRUM, supra note 2, at 1 (“[E]stimates of the domestic economic impact 
of wireless technology approach[] $1 trillion annually . . . .”). 
 7. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2010) (setting forth in tabular format all radio frequency allocations). 
 8. See, e.g., Thomas M. Lenard et al., Increasing Spectrum for Broadband: What are the 
Options?, 1030 PLI/Pat 611 (2010); Karen R. Sprung, Note, Broadcast v. Broadband? A Survey of the 
Reallocation of Broadcast Spectrum for Wireless Broadband, 19 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 238 (2010); FCC, 
OMNIBUS BROADBAND INITIATIVE (OBI), SPECTRUM ANALYSIS: OPTIONS FOR BROADCAST 
SPECTRUM, OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 3 (2010), available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/ 
fcc-omnibus-broadband-initiative-(obi)-technical-paper-spectrum-analysis-options-for-broadband-
spectrum.pdf; Stuart M. Benjamin, Roasting the Pig to Burn Down the House: A Modest Proposal, 7 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95 (2009) [hereinafter Benjamin, Roasting the Pig]; Comment of 
Thomas W. Hazlett, Unleashing the DTV Band: A Proposal for an Overlay Auction (Dec. 18, 2009) 
(in response to Data Sought on Public Uses of Spectrum, GN Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-51 & 09-137, 
NBP Public Notice #26, 24 FCC Rcd. 14275) [hereinafter Unleashing the DTV Band]; COLEMAN 
BAZELON, THE BRATTLE GROUP, THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM FOR WIRELESS 
BROADBAND: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REALLOCATIONS (2009); Adam Thierer & 
Barbara Esbin, An Offer They Can’t Refuse: Spectrum Reallocation That Can Benefit Consumers, 
Broadcasters and the Mobile Broadband Sector, 5 PROGRESS SNAPSHOT, no. 13, Nov. 2009; Stuart M. 
Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communication Commission’s National Television Ownership Cap: 
What’s Bad for Broadcasting is Good for the Country, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2004); see also 
Kathryn A. Watson, Note, White Open Spaces: Unlicensed Access to Unused Television Spectrum Will 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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some of its own reserves for public use,
9
 which the government recently 
pledged to do.
10
 Consensus, it would seem, has been established among 
economists, communications law scholars, lobbyists, and governmental 
regulators that spectrum reallocation can solve the problems created by 
ever increasing demand for bandwidth-intensive wireless services in the 
U.S. 
In this Commentary, we explain why this consensus is wrong. Put 
simply, spectrum reallocation plans offer far too little, far too late. 
Problems stemming from exponential growth in mobile data needs
11
 
cannot be resolved by purely cellular solutions that scale linearly. 
Spectrum reallocation, therefore, is at best a temporary quick fix, not a 
long-term solution. If reallocation advocates get their wish, spectrum 
licensed for wireless broadband will increase by less than 200 percent.
12
 
Stacked against predictions of a 26-fold increase in mobile traffic in the 
next five years, a 3-fold expansion of available spectrum is exposed for 
what it is: woefully inadequate. Thus, while scholarship calling for 
spectrum reallocation is not per se unfounded,
13
 this issue is almost 
certainly moot if current data trends continue or accelerate. At this time, 
 
 
Provide an Unprecedented Level of Interconnectivity, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 181 (2010); 
Thomas W. Hazlett, Tragedy T.V.: Rights Fragmentation and the Junk Band Problem (George Mason 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-03, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1533499. 
 9. See, e.g., Lenard et al., supra note 8; Dale N. Hatfield, The Challenge of Increasing 
Broadband Capacity, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 56 (2010); Phillipa Marks & Brian Williamson, 
Spectrum Allocation, Spectrum Commons and Public Goods: The Role of the Market, COMM. & 
STRATEGIES, no. 67, Sept. 2007, at 65 (“Currently spectrum is not allocated to the most valuable uses, 
particularly the large amount of spectrum held for government use . . . .”); see also Benjamin Lennett 
& Sascha D. Meinrath, Seven Key Options for Spectrum Allocation and Assignment, 14 J. INTERNET 
L., no. 3, Sept. 2010 (proposing various other actions not related to reallocation). 
 10. In March 2010, the FCC recommended that 500 MHz of public and private spectrum should 
be reallocated for broadband use over the next decade. FCC, OMNIBUS BROADBAND INITIATIVE (OBI), 
CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 10, 75–76, 84–88, GN Docket No. 09-51 
(2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN]. 
 11. See supra note 1; see also Christine M. Crowe & Mark D. Schneider, Major Wireless Policy 
Developments September 2009–September 2010, 1030 PLI/Pat 183, 187 (2010); Charles M. Davidson 
& Michael J. Santorelli, Seizing the Mobile Moment: Spectrum Allocation Policy for the Wireless 
Broadband Century, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 51–53 (2010); Hatfield, supra note 9, at 60. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. Though a discussion of the costs and benefits of reallocation is beyond the scope of this 
Commentary, two of us have argued elsewhere that recent proposals to reallocate broadcast television 
spectrum for wireless cellular use are generally technically unsound. Many such proposals are based 
on International Telecommunications Union spectrum needs models that are highly sensitive. See 
Comment of James Krogmeier & David Love, Technical Review: The Ongoing Need for Over-the-Air 
Broadcasting, at 18–24 (Dec. 22, 2009), filed as Attachment A to Joint Comments of the Association 
for Maximum Service Television, Inc. & the National Association of Broadcasters (in response to 
Data Sought on Public Uses of Spectrum, GN Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-51 & 09-137, NBP Public Notice 
#26, 24 FCC Rcd. 14275). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/6
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proposals to reallocate spectrum among wireless providers, TV 
broadcasters, and government users—well-meaning as they might be—
serve only as distractions that divert attention from other, potentially 
viable solutions.  
In our view, now is the time for spectrum reallocation proposals to take 
a backseat to policy initiatives that encourage the rapid deployment of 
emerging network technologies that promise exponential growth in 
network capacity.
14
 Rather than a “spectrum” crunch caused by inefficient 
resource management at the FCC, the wireless industry is first and 
foremost facing a “data” crunch caused by its own unwillingness to adopt 
new technologies capable of matching the high throughput mobile users 
require.
15
 Instead of waging lengthy battles against current spectrum 
holders which so far have led to minimal gain, scholars and government 
regulators should hasten efforts to bring from theory to practice emerging 
technologies that promise drastic improvements in wireless data 
throughput and cross-technology solutions that bypass crowded spectrum 
altogether.
16
 Until policy efforts are redirected toward fostering the rapid 
development of cutting edge network technology and such technologies 
are well on their way to widespread adoption, proposals to reallocate 
spectrum look an awful lot like well-intentioned plans to rearrange the 
deck chairs on a sinking ship. 
I. THE SPECTRUM REALLOCATION DEBATE  
Pointing to annual reports on the meteoric rise of cellular traffic, 
scholars have argued for the better part of a decade that the FCC should 
permit wireless broadband providers to takeover spectrum allocated to 
 
 
 14. See Martin Cooper, Personal Communications and Spectrum Policy for the 21st Century, 31 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 566, 567–68 (2007) (observing that, thanks to continual innovation in 
networking technology, the “practical capacity of the radio spectrum” has doubled roughly every 30 
months over the past 110 years). 
 15. Cf. UZOMA ONYEIJE, ONYEIJE CONSULTING LLC, SOLVING THE CAPACITY CRUNCH: 
OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING DATA CAPACITY ON WIRELESS NETWORKS (2011), available at http://www. 
nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/042511_Solving_the_Capacity_Crunch.pdf (“At some point in 
this policy debate, the word ‘capacity’ began to be used nearly synonymously with the word 
‘spectrum.’ The conflation of these terms has led to a disproportionate emphasis on spectrum 
reallocation as a solution to capacity constraints although it is merely one method of achieving that 
result.”).  
 16. Krogmeier & Love, supra note 13, at 18–24; see also Hatfield, supra note 9, at 61–62 
(mentioning “microcells, picocells, and femtocells, as well as ‘smart antennas’ and outdoor Distributed 
Antenna Systems”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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incumbents like television broadcasters and government users.
17
 
According to these scholars, the FCC has performed poorly as a steward of 
the nation’s spectrum resources by failing miserably to place spectrum in 
the hands of society’s highest value users. In this oft-repeated scholarly 
narrative, many non-cellular spectrum holders are portrayed as entrenched 
oligopolists. For example, television broadcasters are said to have 
successfully lobbied over the years to keep much of the same bandwidth 
they have controlled since the 1950s
18—a “Mother Lode of underutilized 
radio spectrum” that may be “worth over $100 billion in license value and 
at least ten times that amount in Consumer Surplus”19—even though they 
have lost considerable market share over the years to cable and satellite 
TV providers.
20
 
Accordingly, scholars have repeatedly called upon the government to 
take back spectrum from some existing holders, reallocate that spectrum 
for wireless broadband, and distribute licenses to wireless providers via 
auction.
21
 Advocates of spectrum reallocation won a victory of sorts in 
 
 
 17. Calls for the FCC to transition spectrum licenses from television broadcasters to wireless 
providers date back as early as 2001. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited 
Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: 
An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001); Stuart M. Benjamin, The 
Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1 (2002). See also 
Jeffrey Silva, TV Spectrum Could Convert to Wireless, RADIO COMM. REP., July 8, 1996, http://www. 
rcrwireless.com/article/19960708/sub/tv-spectrum-could-convert-to-wireless/ (discussing a nascent 
FCC plan at the time to “reallocate TV channels 60 to 69 and make the spectrum available through 
competitive bidding for next-generation voice, data and video wireless services”). 
 18. See, e.g., Unleashing the DTV Band, supra note 8, at 5 fig. 1 (showing that over-the-air 
television broadcasters still utilize 294 MHz of the 486 MHz they were allotted in 1952). 
 19. Id. at 3–4. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, A Welfare Analysis of 
Spectrum Allocation Policies, 40 RAND J. ECON. 424 (2009). 
 20. See, e.g., David Goldman, One in eight to cut cable and satellite TV in 2010, CNNMONEY 
(Apr. 30, 2010, 10:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/30/technology/dropping_cable_tv/ (noting 
that “just over 90% of U.S. households subscribe to some form of pay TV” though this number may 
have dropped considerably in the last few years). Worse still, FCC regulations currently prohibit TV 
broadcasters from transferring their rights to other users. Each TV station must utilize all 6 MHz of its 
allotted channel; it cannot sublicense its spectrum in whole or in part for another use like wireless 
broadband service. See Unleashing the DTV Band, supra note 8, at 8. Legislative attempts to permit 
spectrum sharing remain ongoing, see Reforming Airwaves by Developing Incentives and 
Opportunistic Sharing (RADIOS) Act, S. 455, 112th Cong. § 5(c) (2011) (implementing a pilot 
program “to advance and promote spectrum sharing and reuse activities”); Public Safety Spectrum and 
Wireless Innovation Act, S. 28, 112th Cong. § 204 (2011) (establishing FCC authority to hold 
“incentive auctions” disseminating spectrum relinquished by current licensees), but similar legislation 
has failed repeatedly in the past, see, e.g., S. 649, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 3756, 111th Cong. (2010). 
Aspects of these bills were also incorporated in the Obama Administration’s recently announced 
American Jobs Act. The American Jobs Act §§ 272–99, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/jobs 
act#jobs-text.  
 21. See, e.g., Benjamin, Roasting the Pig, supra note 8, at 96 (calling for the FCC “to reclaim 
spectrum devoted to lower valued uses from the existing licensees, to allocate it to higher valued uses, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/6
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March 2010 when the FCC unveiled a National Broadband Plan with the 
stated goal of transitioning 500 MHz of public and private spectrum to the 
wireless broadband pool over the next decade.
22
 Advocates were unable, 
however, to convince regulators to divest TV broadcasters of the 294 MHz 
of spectrum currently allocated to the remaining forty-nine television 
broadcast channels.
23
 
If the National Broadband Plan was supposed to end debate about 
spectrum redistribution, it has failed to do so. Since plans were announced 
last year, calls for reclamation of broadcast spectrum have grown more 
frequent and urgent.
24
 For now, it seems, public discussion of spectrum 
policy is firmly anchored to ongoing debate about the relative value of 
broadcast television. 
II. VIABLE SOLUTIONS MUST SCALE EXPONENTIALLY  
With scholars and policymakers single-mindedly focused for years on 
spectrum reallocation, it seems that few stopped along the way to consider 
whether reallocation could actually quench the nation’s thirst for high 
throughput data service. While an infusion of spectrum may have seemed 
like a viable solution to keep the wireless industry afloat in the early- to 
mid-2000s when the vast majority of wireless traffic was generated by 
basic-feature cell phones, even a cursory review of current data reveals 
that spectrum reallocation alone is not a viable solution for an industry 
now dominated by smartphones, tablet computers, and mobile-broadband-
equipped laptops, each of which consume 24, 122, and 515 times as much 
bandwidth as a cell phone, respectively.
25
  
 
 
and then redistribute (ideally, via auction) spectrum rights to a new set of licensees”). 
 22. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 10, at 75 (recommending the reallocation of 500 
MHz of new spectrum over the next decade, of which 300 MHz should be allocated within 5 years); 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Unleashing the Wireless 
Broadband Revolution (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
presidential-memorandum-unleashing-wireless-broadband-revolution (directing the Secretary of 
Commerce and NTIA to collaborate with the FCC to make 500 MHz available over the next 10 years). 
 23. Television broadcasters controlled 402 MHz—i.e., 67 channels—until 2009, when the switch 
to digital broadcasting accompanied an 18-channel reduction. See Unleashing the DTV Band, supra 
note 8, at 5. 
 24. Media attention, for example, has increased markedly. See, e.g., Jenkins, Jr., supra note 4. 
 25. See CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX, supra note 1, at 7 fig. 4; see also Implementation of 
Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 14th Report, 25 FCC Rcd. 11407, 
11417 (2010) (“[T]raditional handset users generate, on average, 25 MB of traffic each month, 
BlackBerry users generate 54 MB, iPhone users generate 275 MB, other smartphone users generate 
150 MB, and laptop ‘aircard’ users generate 1.4 gigabytes (GB).”). 
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The absence of this fact from policy debates is surprising given how 
easy it is to see why reallocation is bound to fail.
26
 Consider a simple 
thought experiment. Suppose advocates for reallocation get their wish and 
FCC regulators reclaim all 294 MHz currently licensed to television 
broadcasters and make it immediately available to wireless providers.
27
 
Additionally, in a fit of civil-minded generosity, the government agrees to 
increase its National Broadband Plan goal from 500 to 660 MHz and 
makes that spectrum available immediately, rather than slowly over the 
next decade. 
Combined with the 547 MHz already available for mobile broadband 
use,
28
 wireless providers now have access to some 1.5 GHz. In other 
words, even in a rather fanciful best-case scenario, spectrum reallocation 
offers at most an immediate 3-fold increase in available spectrum. 
Keeping in mind that traffic increases have averaged over 2.5-fold per 
year for three years running and are projected to increase as much as 26-
fold by 2015, it is easy to see why even aggressive reallocation is like 
putting a Band-Aid on a bullet hole. Put simply, solutions must scale. As 
long as demand for wireless bandwidth continues to increase at an 
exponential rate, any discrete influx of spectrum to existing cellular 
systems and architectures, even one almost 800 MHz in size, will soon be 
dwarfed by the ever-rising tide of mobile traffic. 
III. TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS TO THE REAL PROBLEM  
What the data crunch calls for, then, are solutions that promise 
exponentially scalable increases in the efficiency of existing spectrum 
resources. Fortunately, several slowly emerging communications 
technologies promise just such a solution, if they can swiftly be put into 
practice.  
 
 
 26. This is by no means the first time the FCC’s ability to gather and analyze data has been 
called into question. See generally Rob Frieden, Case Studies in Abandoned Empiricism and the Lack 
of Peer Review at the Federal Communications Commission, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 277 
(2010). 
 27. Immediate availability, of course, is unattainable. Past experience shows that it takes years 
for reallocated spectrum to make its way to new licensees. See, e.g., OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 6, 
supra note 1, at 15–16 (2010) (noting that spectrum made available six years ago “is just now coming 
online”); Blair Levin, You Can’t Coach Height: A Winning Spectrum Strategy, BLOGBAND: THE 
OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE NAT’L BROADBAND PLAN (Oct. 29, 2009), http://blog.broadband.gov/? 
entryId=10624 (noting that “it takes an average of 6 to 13 years to clear spectrum”).  
 28. See, e.g., OBI TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 6, supra note 1, at 15. “Old stock” cellular and PCS 
bands comprise 170 MHz of this amount; the remaining 377 MHz consists of “flexible use” bands, 
including the AWS, 2.5 GHz, and 700 MHz bands, that are not widely used outside major 
metropolitan areas. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss3/6
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A. Spectral Efficiency and Cross-Technology Solutions 
Several technologies under development promise to drastically increase 
the capacity of our airwaves. So-called “cognitive radio” is one such 
example.
29
 This technology utilizes “self-aware” radios, which can detect 
changes in the propagation environment, interference conditions, user 
demands, and the like, and adapt accordingly to achieve optimum 
performance.
30
 Fully developed cognitive radio technology may well 
permit multiple networks to co-exist at the same spectrum band with little 
or no interference
31—a technical accomplishment that alone would exceed 
the benefits of even the most extreme spectrum reallocation plans. 
Other technology promises even more impressive results. Rapid 
deployment of emerging “tiered network” technology, which employs 
densely packed low-power cells in coordination with or in place of 
existing cell towers,
32
 might also single-handedly solve the wireless 
industry’s data woes. With this kind of “picocell” or “femtocell” 
technology, many more cells (and thus many more users) in the same 
geographic area can use the same frequency band at the same time.
33
 Other 
examples include technologies that would permit cell towers to coordinate 
with one another in “multicell” or “network” multiple input multiple 
output (MIMO) systems,
34
 and improved techniques that would for the 
 
 
 29. See generally Joseph Mitola III & Gerald Q. Maguire, Jr., Cognitive Radio: Making Software 
Radios More Personal, 6 IEEE PERSONAL COMM., no. 4, Aug. 1999, at 13; Simon Haykin, Cognitive 
Radio: Brain-Empowered Wireless Communications, 23 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMM. 201 
(2005). 
 30. See Haykin, supra note 29. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See generally Vikram Chandrasekhar et al., Femtocell Networks: A Survey, 46 IEEE COMM. 
MAG., no. 9, Sept. 2008. 
 33. Id.; see also Shu-Ping Yeh et al., Capacity and Coverage Enhancement in Heterogeneous 
Networks, 18 IEEE WIRELESS COMM., no. 3, June 2011, at 32. Reducing cell size also has the added 
benefit of decreasing the distance between the user and the base station, which itself also dramatically 
increases network throughput. See, e.g., THEODORE S. RAPPAPORT, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 60 (2d ed. 2002). Historically, virtually all increases in wireless throughput 
have come from incremental improvements in our ability to reuse spectrum, not from periodic 
infusions of additional spectrum. See Cooper, supra note 14, at 570. 
 34. See generally David Gesbert et al., Multi-Cell MIMO Cooperative Networks: A New Look at 
Interference, 28 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMM. 1380 (2010); Sivarama Venkatesan et al., A 
WiMAX-Based Implementation of Network MIMO for Indoor Wireless Systems, EURASIP J. ON 
ADVANCES IN SIGNAL PROCESSING, July 2009. MIMO systems are so named because they employ 
multiple antennas at both ends of the communication link. Far simpler MIMO systems are now in use 
in 4G cellular technology. See JEFFREY G. ANDREWS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF WIMAX: 
UNDERSTANDING BROADBAND WIRELESS NETWORKING ch. 5.5 (2007); HARRI HOLMA & ANTTI 
TOSKALA, LTE FOR UMTS: EVOLUTION FOR LTE-ADVANCED 80–81 (2d ed. 2011); David Astely et 
al., LTE: The Evolution of Mobile Broadband, 47 IEEE COMM. MAG., no. 4, Apr. 2009, at 44, 48.  
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first time allow robust wireless communication at extremely high 
frequencies currently deemed “unusable” for mobile broadband.35  
In addition to technologies that permit high-efficiency use of existing 
spectrum, other systems under development would help reduce wireless 
congestion by quickly steering mobile broadband traffic off the airwaves 
entirely and onto other infrastructure better suited to accommodating data-
intensive applications.
36
 Wireless devices could, for example, come 
equipped with multiple radios that would permit “cross-platform” or 
“cross-technology” communication—i.e., data transmission via the most 
efficient communication link available at any given time.
37
 Such 
technology would allow a mobile device user to communicate via the 
cellular network with one radio when on the go and when at home via her 
much faster fiber, cable, or DSL link using a separate WiFi-enabled radio 
on the same device.
38
  
 
 
 35. Though many spectrum reallocation advocates have branded frequencies above 3 GHz 
unsuitable for mobile broadband, see Comments of CTIA – The Wireless Assoc., at 13 (Apr. 22, 2011) 
(in response to Spectrum Task Force Requests Information on Frequency Bands Identified by NTIA as 
Potential Broadband Spectrum, ET Docket No. 10-123, Public Notice, 26 FCC Rcd. 3486 (2011)) 
(“Spectrum above 3 GHz is useful for wireless services but not mobile broadband at this time.”), 
available at http://ecfsdocs.fcc.gov/filings/2011/04/22/6016378170.html, emerging technology will 
allow high-frequency bands to play a valuable role in mobile broadband networks. In addition to bands 
located only slightly above 3 GHz, there has been much recent interest in millimeter wave systems 
(particularly those that use the unlicensed 60 GHz band) and terahertz systems. See generally Peter 
Smulders, Exploiting the 60 GHz Band for Local Wireless Multimedia Access: Prospects and Future 
Directions, 40 IEEE COMM. MAG., no. 1, Jan. 2002; Robert C. Daniels et al., 60 GHz Wireless: Up 
Close and Personal, 11 IEEE MICROWAVE MAG., no. 7, Dec. 2010; Radoslaw Piesiewicz et al., Short-
Range Ultra-Broadband Terahertz Communications: Concepts and Perspectives, 49 IEEE ANTENNAS 
& PROPAGATION MAG., no. 6, Dec. 2007; Ho-Jin Song et al., Terahertz Wireless Communication Link 
at 300 GHz, PROC. IEEE TOPICAL MEETING ON MICROWAVE PHOTONICS, Oct. 2010, at 42. Though 
high frequency systems have experienced problems with signal power in the past, new antenna and RF 
technology is quickly making this point surmountable. See Daniels et al., supra, at 2–3. For example, 
because signals have smaller wavelengths at higher frequencies, large arrays of small antennas can be 
built into a device of reasonable size. See Chinh H. Doan et al., Design Considerations for 60 GHz 
CMOS Radios, 42 IEEE COMM. MAG., no. 12, Dec. 2004, at 132. In fact, high frequency systems seem 
to be the perfect technology for backhaul networks (using highly directional beams and short-range 
communication). See Nan Guo et al., 60-GHz Millimeter-Wave Radio: Principle, Technology, and 
New Results, EURASIP J. WIRELESS COMM. & NETWORKING, Sept. 2006.  
 36. See Krogmeier & Love, supra note 13, at 18–24 (noting that some data-intensive applications 
currently processed over mobile broadband networks could be accommodated by other high rate 
communications technologies such as fiber, cable, DSL, WiFi, and broadcast television, and 
furthermore that existing estimates of future spectrum needs fail to consider this fact). 
 37. See generally Shu-Ping Yeh et al., supra note 33, at 32; Chandrasekhar et al., supra note 32.  
 38. See generally Kyunghan Lee et al., Mobile Data Offloading: How Much Can WiFi Deliver?, 
PROC. OF ACM CONEXT, Nov.–Dec. 2010; Yiannis Yiakoumis et al., Slicing Home Networks, PROC. 
ACM SIGCOMM WORKSHOP ON HOME NETWORKS, Aug. 2011. 
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B. Encouraging Adoption 
In principle, these technologies together may offer exponential 
increases in spectrum utilization that can rival the exponential growth of 
mobile data needs. “Cooper’s Law”—named after Martin Cooper, the 
inventor of the first mobile phone
39—predicts that advances in networking 
technology double spectral efficiency roughly every thirty months.
40
 
Unlike the more familiar “Moore’s Law” from the computing industry 
which has accurately predicted the exponential growth of actual 
computing power for decades,
41
 Cooper’s Law predicts exponential 
increases only in the practical capacity of wireless networks using “the 
best technique available at any given time.”42 Why the discrepancy? 
Despite ever-growing demand for wireless services, established players in 
the wireless industry have been notoriously reluctant to embrace new 
cellular technology, a fact that has created a growing backlog of improved 
networking standards waiting for industry adoption.  
While scholars have been quick to label television broadcasters as rent-
seeking oligopolists, few have noted that the industry on the other side of 
this debate is dominated by only four behemoths,
43
 two of which just 
attempted to merge last year.
44
 Historically, these wireless giants have 
been agonizingly slow to adopt new standards. Rather than accelerate 
 
 
 39. See, e.g., Tania Teixeira, Meet Marty Cooper—the Inventor of the Mobile Phone, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ click_online/8639590.stm. 
 40. Cooper, supra note 14, at 567–68. To be clear, not all networking technologies described 
above are alone capable of accommodating exponential growth. It is the combined effect of new 
technologies that has historically scaled exponentially.  
 41. See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits, 
ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, at 114, 115 (predicting that computing power will double approximately 
every two years). 
 42. Cooper, supra note 14, at 567 (noting that his observations are based on the “practical” 
capacity of available spectrum). 
 43. Collectively, AT&T Wireless, Verizon Wireless, Sprint, and T-Mobile control about 82% of 
the mobile broadband market. See, e.g., Brian Osbourne, Should we agree with Sprint’s CEO that 
AT&T will be too big?, GEEK.COM (Mar. 25, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.geek.com/articles/mobile/ 
should-we-agree-with-sprints-ceo-that-att-will-be-too-big-20110325/. 
 44. In March 2011, AT&T announced plans to acquire T-Mobile, a move that if consummated 
would have placed 80% of the cell phone market in the hands of AT&T and Verizon. See Cecilia 
Kang, Senate panel chairman Kohl: AT&T, T-Mobile merger should be blocked, POST TECH (July 20, 
2011, 2:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/atandt-t-mobile-merger- would-
be-a-setback-democratic-lawmakers-tell-fcc-justice-dept/2011/07/20/gIQAy0gyPI_blog.html. In August 
2011, the Department of Justice filed suit to block AT&T’s proposed merger with T-Mobile. United 
States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 31, 2011). In light of ongoing resistance 
from government regulators, AT&T called-off the deal in December 2011. See, e.g., Michael J. De La 
Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, NY TIMES (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-mobile/.  
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innovation, they have largely maintained the status quo for years by 
amassing large spectrum reserves to accommodate new users and growing 
data demands without rolling out new technology.
45
  
In addition to stifling innovation, this practice—sometimes referred to 
as “spectrum hoarding”—is especially pernicious because it acts as a 
formidable barrier to entry for new wireless competitors.
46
 Every spectrum 
band held by industry incumbents is one less band available to new market 
players, a fact that is particularly troubling because, as in so many other 
industries, advances in mobile networking technology are predominantly 
championed by small firms.
47
 Then-upstart Qualcomm was the first to 
introduce code division multiple access (CDMA) equipment in the early 
 
 
 45. See Saturated Mobile Networks, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2010, available at http://www. 
economist.com/node/15498399 (“The cheapest way to increase capacity is to add more spectrum or to 
move a network to a lower frequency, which allows radio waves to penetrate walls more easily. So 
operators tend to lobby governments for more and better spectrum before investing in expensive kit.”); 
Letter from Gordon H. Smith, Pres. & CEO, Nat’l Assoc. of Broadcasters, to Jay Rockefeller, U.S. 
Senator (Feb. 28, 2011), available at http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pdfs/022811_Smith_ 
spectrum_ltr.pdf (noting that many companies are “warehousing ‘surplus spectrum’ that, if deployed, 
presumably could help alleviate the alleged ‘spectrum crisis’”); see also Caroline Gabriel, NextWave 
warns of possible return to bankruptcy, RETHINK WIRELESS (July 18, 2011), http://www.rethink-
wireless.com/2011/07/18/nextwave-warns-possible-return-bankruptcy.htm (documenting the troubled 
history of notorious spectrum speculator NextWave Wireless). 
 46. See ONYEIJE, supra note 15, at 8 (“‘[O]wnership’ of spectrum is concomitant with 
exclusivity. When one acquires exclusive rights to spectrum, that spectrum is not available to others 
that might compete.”); Susan P. Crawford, The Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 
974–75 (2008) (“Incumbents . . . will be willing to pay ‘whatever it takes’ to win the auction, because 
their top priority is blocking new entrants rather than paying the market price for spectrum.”); Gregory 
Rose, Spectrum Auction Breakdown: How Incumbents Manipulate FCC Auction Rules To Block 
Broadband Competition (New Am. Found., Working Paper No. 18, 2007), available at http://www. 
newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaper18_FCCAuctionRules_Rose_FINAL.pdf (documenting collusion 
among incumbents against new entrants in spectrum auctions). 
 47. See Mark A. Lemley, If AT&T Marries T-Mobile, All of Us Will Lose, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
Aug. 9, 2011, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2011/08/09/v-wireless/3825030/if-att-marries-t-
mobile-all-of.html (attributing recent, “tremendous innovation” in wireless technology to “outsiders 
like Apple and Google and fringe competitors like T-Mobile, not Verizon or AT&T”). The 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries are two other examples. See John M. Golden, 
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American 
System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 167 (2001); Yusing Ko, Note, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology 
Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 800 (1992) (“[T]raditional pharmaceutical companies, despite 
their superior innovative resources, lag far behind the small start-up companies in contributing to 
biotechnological innovations.”). Indeed, some commentators have argued that large dominant firms by 
their very nature are ill-suited to innovate. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 279 (1982) (noting that a large firm’s “hierarchical 
structure and culture may be inimical to innovation, or at least inimical to radical innovation”). On the 
innovative advantages small firms have over their large counterparts, see generally ZOLTAN J. ACS & 
DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS (1990); RAY OAKEY ET AL., THE 
MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY SMALL FIRMS (1988). 
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1990s,
48
 IOSpan built the first commercial system using MIMO 
technology in 2001,
49
 and most recently it was tiny Clearwire—not AT&T 
or Verizon—that began rolling out the nation’s first 4G mobile network.50 
With wireless companies’ spectrum reserves finally beginning to run dry, 
now is the time to reduce wireless providers’ dependence on the 
availability of new spectrum, not to briefly extend the status quo with an 
influx of new spectrum, taken this time not at the expense of new entrants 
but from licensees in another industry entirely.  
Thus, we believe policymakers would better serve the public by 
facilitating the rapid adoption of emerging technologies in the wireless 
industry, rather than endlessly debating spectrum reallocation. If, as 
scholars and policymakers seem to agree in principle, regulation of the 
airwaves should above all else seek to place spectrum in the hands of 
society’s highest value users, spectrum policy should strive to place 
wireless broadband licenses in the hands of the most efficient wireless 
providers before simply importing spectrum from other supposedly less-
efficient industries.  
Though it is not our purpose in this brief Commentary to articulate a 
comprehensive policy framework to effectuate this change, a few reforms 
to the FCC’s procedure for spectrum licensing could go a long way toward 
closing the technology gap between systems in use and standards waiting 
for widespread adoption.
51
 For one, the FCC could condition spectrum 
license renewals on licensees’ achievement of periodically increasing 
 
 
 48. See generally Eric Nee & Christine Y. Chen, Qualcomm Hits the Big Time Pushing a little-
known digital cellular technology from surf’s-up San Diego, this $4-billion-a-year hotshot wants to be 
The Next Intel, FORTUNE MAG., May 15, 2000, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
fortune_archive/2000/05/15/279766/index.htm; History, QUALCOMM.COM, http://www.qualcomm 
.com/who-we-are/history/story (last visited Jan. 28, 2012). 
 49. See generally Arogyaswami J. Paulraj et al., An Overview of MIMO Communications—A Key 
to Gigbait Wireless, 92 PROC. OF THE IEEE 198 (2004); Hemanth Sampath et al., A Fourth-Generation 
MIMO-OFDM Broadband Wireless System: Design, Performance, and Field Trial Results, 40 IEEE 
COMM. MAG., no. 9, Sept. 2002. 
 50. See The Clearwire Story, CLEARWIRE.COM, http://www.clearwire.com/company/our-
company (last visited Jan. 28, 2012). Sprint acquired a majority stake in Clearwire in late 2008 when 
the company merged with Xohm, Sprint’s wireless broadband division. See Christopher Price, Sprint 
Completes Clearwire Merger, Clear Will Replace XOHM, PHONENEWS.COM (Dec. 1, 2008), http:// 
www.phonenews.com/sprint-completes-clearwire-clear-will-replace-xohm-5650/. 
 51. Certain aspects of legislation currently pending in the Senate represent a promising step in 
the right direction, see S. 911 § 224 (2011) (funding the expansion of NIST and NSF “programs to 
support and promote innovation in the United States through transformative telecommunications 
research” including “cognitive radio technologies” and “low-power communications electronics”); 
Reforming Airwaves by Developing Incentives and Opportunistic Sharing (RADIOS) Act, S. 455, 
112th Cong. § 7 (2011) (allocating funding, especially through the NSF, for spectral efficiency 
research), though these proposals as a whole remain firmly anchored to the reallocation debate and do 
not go nearly far enough in their support for network innovation.  
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efficiency benchmarks.
52
 Similarly, the FCC could favor the most efficient 
wireless providers in the allocation of newly available spectrum, perhaps 
by resurrecting a simple, efficiency-focused version of the short-lived 
“pioneer’s preference rule” implemented in 1991 to “extend[] preferential 
treatment in the FCC’s licensing processes to parties that demonstrated 
their responsibility for developing new spectrum-using communications 
services and technologies.”53  
Whatever the precise mechanisms on the table, policy debates about 
how best to encourage the efficient use of presently allocated spectrum 
will be far more fruitful than ongoing debate about how to make discrete 
changes to existing licenses. Once efficiency gains are on track, debate can 
continue on the social and commercial value of existing government bands 
and broadcast television. Until that time, however, each passing day of 
continued debate makes reallocation a less viable solution and encourages 
the wireless industry to wait for yet another influx of spectrum to kick 
their problems down the road. 
 
 
 52. See Marguerite Reardon, Rethinking the Wireless Spectrum Crisis, SIGNAL STRENGTH (May 
25, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-20005831-266.html (“If I get granted an 
exclusive license, and the FCC grants me broad protection, my incentive is to make the cheapest, 
dumbest equipment possible, . . . . But if the FCC demands more efficient use of the spectrum, then 
license holders have the incentive to use more intelligent devices that use the spectrum more 
efficiently.” (quoting Kevin Werbach)). 
 53. See Pioneer’s Preference Program, FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/faqs/pioneerfaqs.html 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012). As implemented in the early 1990s, the pioneer’s preference rule proved 
unmanageable, largely because government regulators were unable to accurately select ex ante which 
technologies would become successful. See John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: 
Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 
1140–43 (2000). It was ultimately scrapped in part over budgetary concerns. See Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
FCC, 181 F.3d 1370, 1380–81 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“When Congress in 1994 set the date for withdrawal 
of the FCC’s authority to grant new pioneer’s preferences, its focus was on increasing federal revenues 
. . . .”). We do not recommend the wholesale revival of this program. We simply recommend that the 
FCC ensure that some spectrum remains available to accommodate small companies developing next-
generation networking technologies and, moreover, that when such technologies have proven 
themselves highly-efficient (something that should be relatively easy to verify ex post) their owners 
have occasional opportunities to reclaim spectrum from incumbents using old technology. Spectrum 
licenses should function more as a revolving door letting innovators in and pushing laggards out, and 
less as a locked door keeping laggards safely inside and shutting innovators out in the cold. See 
ENHANCING ACCESS TO THE RADIO SPECTRUM, supra note 2, at 3 (“Spectrum management must be 
flexible to accommodate changing usage models and opportunities created by advances in 
technology.”); Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An Innovation-Centric Approach of Telecommunications 
Infrastructure Regulation, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 221, 223 (2011) (“[B]ecause network innovation 
seems to be drawing significant benefits from an enlarged pool of actors, even if they are less efficient 
than a single big actor, . . . regulators wishing to prioritize innovation may be required to intervene in 
favor of facilitating entry . . . .”). But see T. Randolph Beard et al., A Policy Framework for Spectrum 
Allocation in Mobile Communications, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 639, 644–45 (2011) (arguing that 
consolidation in the wireless industry “is merely the industry adjusting towards a sustainable structure” 
as existing firms seek “sufficient spectrum to run scalable networks”). 
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CONCLUSION 
At a minimum, we hope this Commentary serves as a call for 
communication and network technology experts to have a seat at the table 
in spectrum policy debates. There is far too little interaction between 
policymakers, who are predominantly drawn from the disciplines of 
economics and law, and wireless communications experts, who are 
predominantly engineers. The capacity of our nation’s wireless networks 
depends on two variables: the distribution of spectrum resources (i.e., the 
width in Hertz of each licensee’s allocated frequency band) and the 
spectral efficiency of cellular architectures currently in use (i.e., the 
number of bits-per-second transmitted per Hertz).
54
 All too often, it seems, 
policymakers focus almost exclusively on the former, and communication 
and networking engineers on the latter, without regard for the work of one 
another.
55
 Perhaps because of this disconnect, current policy seems 
hopelessly fixated on proposals that are destined to fail. If mobile data 
needs continue their exponential growth, any solution that employs current 
cellular network architectures cannot succeed, no matter how much 
spectrum regulators pump into the wireless industry. Against the rising 
tide of data, only technology stands a chance. 
 
 
 54. Spectral efficiency, in turn, is also a factor of two variables: geographic reuse (i.e., the 
number of times that a specific frequency band can be reused in a given area without interference) and 
data transmission algorithm efficiency (i.e., the number of bits-per-second passing through each band 
repetition). See, e.g., DAVID TSE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATION 7 (2005).  
 55. It is not surprising, of course, that lawyers, economists, and engineers tend to view spectrum 
policy through the lens of their respective specialties. As the old saying goes: “It is tempting, if the 
only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.” ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE: A RECONNAISSANCE 15 (1966). 
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